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1. Mind the Gaps: The ILC Guide to Practice and Reservations to Human Rights Treaties   
Dr Kasey L McCall-Smith 
1.1 Introduction 
At the best of times the rules on reservations to treaties baffle many international law 
practitioners and the states that must navigate them. The persisting confusion from the 
application of the default reservations regime codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties1 (Vienna Convention) is exacerbated when these rules are used to interpret 
reservations to human rights treaties. Great hope for clarity in the reservations rules was 
focused on the outcome of the eighteen year study on reservations to treaties conducted by 
the International Law Commission (ILC). However, following the 2011 publication of the 
ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties2 (Guide to Practice or Guide) it is apparent 
that despite several progressive guidelines, little has changed in the context of reservations to 
human rights treaties. 
 
The long-standing universality versus integrity debate is facilitated by the Vienna Convention 
reservations rules, rules which are frequently described along the lines of ‘complex, 
ambiguous, and often counterintuitive’.3 Applying these general reservations rules to human 
rights treaties, which are challenged for many of the same reasons, creates a system of 
ambiguity and confusion about the obligations owed by states. This perpetuates the failure of 
many States Parties to actually implement human rights obligations. As the cornerstone of 
international law, treaties demand clear legal rules yet, in practice, it is obvious that states 
                                                          
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (Vienna Convention). 
2 International Law Commission (ILC), Report of the International Law Commission on its 63rd Session, Guide 
to Practice on Reservations  with Commentary, UN Doc. A/66/10/Add.1 (2011) (Guide to Practice). 
3 Laurence Helfer, “Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design”, 31 Yale Journal of 
International Law (2006) pp. 367, 367. 
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relish the imprecise nature of the reservations rules, particularly in relation to human rights 
treaties. 
 
The following examines the practice of making reservations to human rights treaties in light 
of the historical attitude of states to these treaties as well evolving state practice and forward-
thinking efforts on the part of the ILC and others. It is based on case study of reservations to 
the core UN human rights treaties and a doctrinal study of the general law of reservations in 
relation to treaties. While the enduring problems of applying the Vienna Convention regime 
to reservations to human rights treaties will be outlined, this article forgoes a repeat of the 
historical development of the reservations rules that have been set forth on many occasions.4 
Instead, it will focus on the reservations practice particular to human rights and examine the 
different types of reservations that plague human rights treaties. Specifically it will address 
the problems perpetuated by the object and purpose test, the lack of clarity of the legal effect 
and consequence of invalid reservations as well as the question of who decides invalidity and 
how this decision is impacted by the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties. Finally, 
the pertinent features of the Guide to Practice will be introduced and examined in light of the 
practical application of the guidelines in response to the problems most prevalent when 
analysing reservations to human rights treaties.  
1.2 Vienna Convention Lacunae 
The flexibility of the reservations regime embodied in Vienna Convention Articles 19–23 is 
the focus of an extraordinary amount of literature largely because the rules often provide no 
definitive answer on the validity of a reservation. Initially, the imprecision of the Article 
19(c) object and purpose test sets the stage for a catalogue of questions about the application 
                                                          
4 e.g. Edward T. Swaine, “Reserving”, 31 Yale Journal of International Law (2006) pp. 307; Catherine 
Redgwell, “The Law or Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human 
Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights 
Conventions (1997); Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? (1995). 
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of these rules. The legal effect and consequence of a decision on invalidity as well as what 
organ may determine the validity of a reservation present further obstacles to their 
application. The following sections introduce the Vienna Convention reservations rules and 
address each  legal gap in turn; one further consideration is also included—the non-reciprocal 
nature of human rights treaties. 
 
1.2.1 Vienna Convention Rules on Reservations 
The Vienna Convention reservations rules are the default rules for all treaties. The rules are 
viewed as customary international law.5 Articles 19 through 21 are the focus of this article. 
Article 19 introduces the conditions under which a state may formulate a reservation and in 
paragraph (c) establishes the object and purpose test for determining the permissibility6 of a 
reservation. The article is a restraint upon state action because it outlines that an incompatible 
reservation may not be made.7  
 
Acceptance of and objection to reservations are governed by Article 20 which  provides that 
an objection does not preclude entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and 
reserving states unless expressly indicated by the objecting state (Article 20(4)(b)). Article 
20(5) further notes that unless the treaty provides an alternative, all reservations will be 
deemed accepted if there are no objections at the end of twelve months thus incorporating the 
tacit acceptance rule. Article 21 governs the legal effect of reservations and provides that a 
reservation will modify the relations between the reserving state and the State 
                                                          
5 See generally, Thomas Giegerich, “Reservations to Multilateral Treaties”, MPEPIL, available via: 
http://www.mpepil.com (accessed on 9 September 2013). 
6 In keeping with the vocabulary preferred by the ILC, references to permissibility encompass evaluations of a 
reservation under Article 19 of the Vienna Convention, and include those specifically examined for 
compatibility using the object and purpose test set forth in Article 19(c). See Guide to Practice on Reservations 
to Treaties, with commentaries as provisionally adopted by the ILC at its 62nd session (see UN doc A/65/10 
(2010) (Draft Guide to Practice), 3.1.3 and accompanying commentary. 
7 Redgwell, “The Law or Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, 8; see also Oona Hathaway, 
“Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935, 1952 et seq. 
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 Parties accepting the reservation to the extent of the reservation. It further outlines that the 
provision affected by the reservation will not apply between the reserving state and any 
objecting state not opposing entry into force of the treaty between the two. The Vienna 
Convention is indifferent to subdivisions of international law and therefore these rules apply 
to treaties relating to the law of the sea and nuclear disarmament as well as human rights 
treaties unless the treaty specifically outlines its own reservations regime. As will be 
presented, the application of the Vienna Convention rules to human rights treaties presents 
several unresolved dilemmas.  
 
Reviewing reservations made to human rights treaties it is clear that many have not been 
assessed by states as contemplated by the Vienna Convention rules, particularly those lodged 
in the earliest days of the human rights treaty movement,. Reservations of questionable or 
obvious invalidity remain attached to human rights treaties primarily because the obligations 
inter se are not affected by an objection pursuant to Article 21. Unlike treaties containing 
reciprocal obligations, the decision of a state to forgo a human rights obligation only impacts 
the third-party beneficiaries of the obligations, individuals, not other State Parties. Thus there 
is normative ambiguity because arguably invalid reservations are maintained by states in the 
absence of objections and, according to the tacit acceptance rule of Article 20(5), those 
reservations to which no objection is made are deemed accepted.  
 
It is not only reservations that are incompatible with Article 19(c) that lead to normative 
ambiguity in the context of human rights treaties. Sweeping reservations and reservations 
subordinating treaty obligations to domestic law also cause incoherence in the treaty system. 
These types of reservations are generally challenged on the basis of incompatibility with 
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Article 19 due to the imprecise reference to domestic law. As it stands, the Vienna 
Convention effectively facilitates the presence of reservations of questionable validity due to 
the absence of guidance as to what should happen when inter-state treaty relations are not 
altered by an objection or acceptance—the non-reciprocal treaty dilemma.   
 
When specifically addressing human rights treaties commentators on the appropriateness of 
the regime tend to fall into two camps. The first group typically relies on general principles of 
international law to support the adequacy of the Vienna Convention to address reservations to 
human rights treaties.8 According to a few such authors the flexibility of the system is a boon 
to human rights treaties.9 The key considerations are the appropriateness of a single residual 
system to govern reservations and the assumption that the Vienna Convention includes a self-
policing element—the acceptance/objection system found in Article 20—which in practice 
has served to counter invalid reservations borne out by the object and purpose test. 
 
The second group of commentators points to the unique characteristics of human rights 
treaties, including non-reciprocity,10 that prevent any meaningful application of the Vienna 
Convention regime11 and the subsequent detrimental effect12 of reservations on the realisation 
of human rights.  Redgwell notes that the flexibility of the Vienna Convention is ‘somehow 
                                                          
8 e.g., Markus Schmidt, “Reservations to United Nations Human Rights Treaties–The Case of the Two 
Covenants”, in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: 
Reservations and Objections to Human Rights Conventions (1997) pp. 20-34., 33; Pierre-Henri Imbert, 
“Reservations and Human Rights Conventions”, 6 Human Rights Review (1981) pp. 28, 46; Anja Seibert-Fohr, 
“The Potentials of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with Respect to Reservations to Human Rights 
Treaties”, in I. Ziemele (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime (2004) 
pp. 183-211, 207.  
9 e.g., Madeline Morris, “Few Reservations”, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law (2000), pp. 341, 343. 
10 Swaine, “Reserving”, 342; Redgwell, “The Law or Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, 18; 
Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties; Imbert, “Reservations and Human Rights Conventions”, 
33. 
11 Catherine Redgwell, “Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24(52)” 
46 ICLQ (1997) pp. 390; Catherine Redgwell, “Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to 
General Multilateral Treaties”, 64 British Yearbook of International Law (BYBIL ) (1993) pp. 245, 252. 
12 See generally, Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties; Rosalyn Higgins, “Human Rights: Some 
Questions of Integrity”, 15 Commonwealth Law Bulletin (1989) pp. 598. 
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contrary to the inalienable political rights and freedoms of human beings’ therefore 
circumstances, such as economic depression, are less palatable excuses for making 
reservations than they might be in the context of an environmental treaty.13 Certain 
commentators have attached an air of moral reprimand to their discussions of reservations 
formulated by states,14 while others contend that they could be a healthy sign that a state has 
seriously considered the treaty and its implications.15 Particularly damning is Hathaway’s 
contention that reservations perpetuate the idea that securing human rights through treaties is 
simply ‘cheap talk’.16 Altogether, the many conflicting opinions underscore that the 
application of the Vienna Convention regime is less than settled, particularly in relation to 
human rights treaties. 
 
1.2.2 The Object and Purpose Test 
The primary problem with the Vienna Convention is that regardless of treaty type the text 
imposes the very vague and subjective object and purpose test to determine the object and 
purpose of a treaty and therefore assess the validity17 of a reservation that is not covered by 
Article 19(a) or (b). Initially, there is an obvious difficulty in applying a subjective test to 
determine whether reservations defeat the object and purpose of a treaty especially 
considering that ‘[i]t is not normal practice in treaty drafting to spell out the “object and 
                                                          
13 Redgwell, “The Law on Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, 18. 
14 e.g., Pierre-Henri Imbert, “Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights Before the Strasbourg 
Commission: the Temeltasch Case” 33 ICLQ (1984) pp. 558, 568, noting the “devious approach” used by 
Switzerland when formulating an interpretative declaration that was subsequently determined to be a reservation 
by the European Commission on Human rights in the Temeltasch case. 
15 Susan Marks, “Three Regional Human Rights Treaties”, in J.P. Gardner (ed.), Human Rights as General 
Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights Conventions (1997) 
pp.35-63, 61. In this instance Marks notes that the small number of reservations to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights suggests that the Charter is not taken seriously. However, the years since Marks’s 
article has seen progress within the African system. 
16 Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, 1946. 
17 Validity is the term adopted by the ILC to “describe the intellectual operation consisting in determining 
whether a unilateral statement made by a State … and purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State … was capable of producing the effects attached in 
principle to the formulation of a reservation.” Therefore, a reservation must be permissible to be valid. See ILC 
Yearbook 2006, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006), 324, para. (2) of the general introduction to Part 3 of the draft 
guidelines. 
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purpose” as if one were defining technical terms.’18 Lijnzaad characterises the object and 
purpose test as ‘both transparent and opaque at the same time’ because though the wording 
seems to provide a clear indicator of what reservations will be acceptable under a treaty, it is 
actually unclear in practice.19 This flexibility stems from the reality that states applying 
identical treaty rules often come to disparate outcomes for a variety of reasons unrelated to 
treaty law. 
 
The general meaning of object and purpose under the Vienna Convention rules has been 
chronically rehashed without a definitive answer from its inception beginning with Brierly20 
and Fitzmaurice21 then, more recently, by Buffard and Zemanek,22 with a host of opinions in 
between.23 Recalling that the object and purpose test stems from the Genocide Advisory 
Opinion24 and the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide25 (Genocide Convention), a convention  with an easily determined object and 
purpose, it is difficult to accept that the object and purpose test remains without further 
guidance. Though outlined in Article 19(c), at no point in the Vienna Convention is the test 
                                                          
18 Schabas, “Time for Innovation and Reform”, 47. 
19 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 4. 
20 James L. Brierly, Report on Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, UN Doc. A/CN.4/41 in ILC Yearbook, 
1951, Vol. II, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1 (1951). 
21 Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, “Reservations to Multilateral Conventions”, 2 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (ICLQ) (1953) pp. 1. 
22 Iain Buffard and Karl Zemanek, “The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: an Enigma?” 3 Austrian Review of 
International and European Law (1998) p. 311.  
23 e.g., Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, “Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent”, 149 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review (2000) pp. 399, 429-39; Jan Klabbers, “Some Problems Regarding the Object and 
Purpose of Treaties”, 8 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (1997) pp. 138; William Schabas, “Reservations 
to Human Rights Treaties:Time for Innovation and Reform”, 32 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
(1994) pp. 39, 47; Daniel Hylton, “Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Inadequate Framework on Reservations”, 27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1994)  pp. 419, 429-32; 
Jean Kyongun Koh, “Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World 
Vision”, 23 Harvard International Law Journal (1982-83) pp. 71; José  M. Ruda, “Reservations to Treaties”, 
146 Recueil des cours (1975) pp. 95.  
24 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 15. 
25 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), 78 UNTS 
277, 9 December 1948. 
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defined,26 nor is this concept limited to reservations—it appears in six27 other provisions of 
the Convention. The negotiating states appear to have embraced the complete vagueness of 
the concept and applied it in every instance where agreement on a more refined standard 
could not be reached. Whilst there has never been a settled approach to applying the object 
and purpose test in the context of reservations, generally commentators interpret the test as 
focusing on the essence or overall goal of the treaty rather than parsing the individual articles, 
thus, the test has proved difficult to apply.28   
 
The object and purpose test represents a constraint on a state’s ability to attach reservations to 
its instrument of ratification; however, ‘the claim that a particular reservation is contrary to 
the object and purpose is easier made than substantiated.’29 This is directly related to the lack 
of guidance on how to apply the test particularly when the treaty being examined contains 
multifarious rights and obligations, such as one of the core30 human rights treaties.  
 
1.2.3 Legal Effect of an Invalid Reservation 
                                                          
26 Alain Pellet, Tenth report on Reservations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/558, Add.1 and Add.2 (2005) para. 77; Hylton, 
“Default Breakdown”, 450. 
27 Reference to the object and purpose of a treaty is also made in Arts. 18, 31, 33, 41 and 58. It also appears in 
Art. 20(2), which is part of the reservations regime, however this article deals with the distinct situation where 
the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent and is 
not the backbone of the reservation rules against which compatibility is assessed. 
28 Helfer, “Not Fully Committed”, 367; Jan Klabbers, “Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Nordic Approach 
to Reservations to Multilateral Treaties”, 69 Nordic Journal of International Law (2000) pp. 179, 181. 
29 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 82-83. 
30 The nine treaties designated as “core” that form the case study are as follows (in order of adoption): the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 660 UNTS 195, 7 March 1966; 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966;  
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1249 UNTS 13, 
18 December 1979; the Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1465 UNTS 85, 10 December 1984; the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), 1577 UNTS 3, 20 November 1989; the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers and Their Families (ICRMW), 2220 UNTS 3, 18 December 1990; the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2515 UNTS 3, 13 December 2006; the International Convention on 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICED), UN Doc. 
A/61/488.C.N.737.2008.TREATIES-12, 20 December 2006. 
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Another crucial sticking point is what to do once a position has been taken on the validity, 
more specifically the invalidity, of a reservation. ‘Invalid’ reservations include those that are 
impermissible for failure to clear Article 19 hurdles as well as reservations that are deficient 
for procedural or structural reasons and reservations that violate other aspects of the Vienna 
Convention or the treaty against which the reservation is made. Whether the reserving state’s 
consent to be bound is affected and whether the reserving state continues to be a contracting 
party is often questioned in relation to a determination that a reservation is invalid.31 Bowett, 
who is credited with the most extensive examination of these questions outside of the ILC, 
framed the issue as tension between two different expressions of the will of the state: on one 
hand a state expresses the will to be bound to a treaty and on the other hand there is the will 
to impose a condition, the invalid reservation.32 He equates the invalidity of the reservation to 
a mistake of law, rather than a mistake of fact, which will not automatically invalidate the 
consent to be bound or the treaty according to the Vienna Convention33.34 Bowett’s work is 
primarily concerned with the resulting relationship between the State Parties. While the legal 
position of the state is an undeniably interesting legal query there is relatively little attention 
paid to what happens as a consequence of a reservation being declared invalid which is more 
important for third party rights-holders under human rights treaties.  
 
It is the lack of guidance on legal effect that facilitates a state’s ability to maintain an invalid 
reservation. The Vienna Convention is silent on legal effect when a reservation to a human 
rights treaty is determined to be invalid by an entity other than a state, such as a treaty body. 
                                                          
31 See generally Ryan Goodman, “Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent”, 96 AJIL 
(2002) pp. 531; Derek W. Bowett, “Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties”, 48 BYBIL  (1976-77) 
67. 
32 Bowett, “Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties”, 76. 
33 Article 48(1) provides: “A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the 
treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the 
treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.” 
34 Bowett, “Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties”, 76. 
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When addressed in an international tribunal the legal effect of the determination will be 
detailed in the decision. Only in the context of the regional human rights systems has the 
question of precisely what legal effect an impermissibility determination has on a reservation 
been examined by an international tribunal.35 The practice of the judiciary in this regard does 
not deliver failsafe answers to the question of legal effect outwith the dispute under 
consideration. 
 
1.2.4 Consequence of Invalidity 
Recognition of the lack of a consequence for an invalid reservation in the Vienna Convention 
is one unifying theme in the reservations debate. A determination of impermissibility under 
Vienna Convention Article 19(c) is ‘deprived of concrete effect’.36 States also recognise the 
failure of the Vienna Convention to address the consequence of invalid reservations as the 
major gap of the reservations regime.37 The lack of consequence is derived from the fact that 
nothing in the Vienna Convention compels a state to take view on a reservation and states, 
save a small number, rarely take issue with reservations to human rights treaties. Even when 
a state does determine a reservation to be invalid there is nothing in the Vienna Convention 
outlining a legal effect capable of creating a concrete consequence. As a result, a state 
formulating an invalid reservation simply maintains the invalid reservation and perpetuates 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., Belilos v. Switzerland, (App. No. 20/1986/118/167), ECtHR, Series A, Vol. 132, 10 EHRR 466, 29 
Apr. 1988; Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
Advisory Opinion OC 2/82 (24 Sept. 1982), IACtHR (Series A) No. 2 (1982); see discussions in Marks, “Three 
Regional Human Rights Treaties”,  35; Susan Marks, “Reservations Unhinged: The Belilos Case Before the 
European Court of Human Rights”, 39 ICLQ (1990) pp. 300;  Iain Cameron and Frank Horn, “Reservations to 
the European Convention on Human Rights: The Belilos Case”, 33 German Yearbook of International Law 
(1990) pp. 69; Ronald St.J. Macdonald, “Reservations under the European Convention on Human Rights”, 1988 
Revue belge de droit international (1988) pp. 429; Henry J. Bourguignon, “The Belilos Case: New Light on 
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties” 29 Virginia Journal of International Law (1988) pp. 347.  
36 Guide to Practice, 2.6.2, commentary para. 26 and 3.3.1, commentary para. 7; Alain Pellet, “The ILC Guide to 
Practice on Reservations to Treaties: A General Presentation by the Special Rapporteur”, 24 European Journal 
of International Law (EJIL) (2013) pp. 1061, 1090; Françoise Hampson, Working paper submitted pursuant to 
Sub-Commission decision 1998/113, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28 (1999) (1999 Working paper), paras. 24, 
31. 
37 Observations by El Salvador, Finland, Norway and Portugal in ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), paras. 119, 
121, 129 and 130. See also Swaine, “Reserving”, 322. 
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the variable myriad of interpretations of its treaty obligations until another State Party calls 
for resolution of the issue.  
 
Current reservation practice tends to favour either nullity or severance as the consequence of 
invalidity though the effectiveness of both doctrines is limited when applied to human rights 
treaties. Determining a concrete consequence is a vital function of rules governing treaty 
interpretation so that obligations owed inter se can be determined. The third-party 
beneficiaries of the core human rights treaties, individuals, are less protected by assertions of 
nullity or severability when the reserving state disagrees and refuses to withdraw the 
reservation. From the domestic level the full expression of an obligation owed by the 
reserving state remains obscured by the reservation and recourse is limited without the 
intervention of another state or dispute resolution mechanism. The ILC suggests that the 
normative gap may ‘have been deliberately created by the authors of the [Vienna] 
Convention.’38 Whether deliberate or not, the current state of reservations, especially in the 
context of human rights treaties, suffers from the lack of more pronounced rules on the 
consequence of an invalidity determination. 
 
1.2.5 Non-reciprocal Nature of Human Rights Treaties 
Non-reciprocity is one of the most salient features of human rights treaties when examining 
the issue of reservations from a pure treaty law perspective. The traditional concept of 
reciprocity is largely a ‘stabilizing factor’ in international treaty law as it allows for a 
balancing of interests between the parties.39 Whilst the Special Rapporteur on Reservations to 
Treaties considers the concern over the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties ‘non-
                                                          
38 Guide to Practice, 3.3.1, commentary para. 2. 
39 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 67.  
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sensical’,40 it has been acknowledged by courts and commentators as a significant 
consideration in the context of reservations to human rights treaties. 41 Reciprocity is essential 
when there is no compulsory judicial system or central authority with the power to enforce 
the law such as the situation of international law.42 There is no ‘probability of harm’43 to the 
interest of a state stemming from the reservation of another state to a human rights treaty. 
Thus, the argument that the Vienna Convention regime is self-policing is unconvincing. The 
non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties will be examined throughout the remainder of 
this article in relation to the specific legal gaps in the Vienna Convention regime. 
 
1.2.6 Who Determines Invalidity? 
There are also discordant views as to which entity—state, court or treaty body—has the 
ultimate competence to assess reservations using the Vienna Convention rules. Some authors 
choose to avoid this question, yet others have argued adamantly in favour of concurrent 
competency including the treaty bodies.44 Linton argues that it is precisely this failure to 
designate a competent mechanism of review that has created a ‘vacuum’45 and perpetuates 
the problem of reservations to human rights treaties. Alston and others have spent many years 
analysing the development, strengths and weaknesses of the treaty bodies as part of the 
                                                          
40 Pellet, “A General Presentation by the Special Rapporteur”, 1079. 
41 e.g. Austria v. Italy, (App. No. 788/60), ECommHR, 4 European YBHR 116 (1961), 11 Jan. 1961, p. 140; 
Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-2/82 (24 Sept. 1982), IACtHR (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982), para. 29; Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary 
Objections, (1 Sept. 2001) IACtHR (Ser. C) No. 80 (2001), para. 95; Redgwell, “The Law or Reservations in 
Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, 18; Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties,. 65-72; Imbert, 
“Reservations and Human Rights Conventions”, 33.  
42 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 68.  
43 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 70; See also, Simma, “From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest”, 296-97. 
44 e.g. Kasey L. McCall-Smith, “Reservations and the Determinative Function of the Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies”, 54 German Yearbook of International Law (2011) pp. 521; Suzannah Linton, “ASEAN States, Their 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed ASEAN Commission on Women and Children”, 30 
Human Rights Quarterly (2008) pp. 436, 486 et seq; Dinah Shelton, “State Practice on Reservations to Human 
Rights Treaties”, 1 Canadian Human Rights Yearbook (1983) pp. 205, 234. 
45 Linton, “ASEAN States”, 486. 
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overall human rights regime.46 These analyses tend to convey mixed messages on the 
competence of the treaty body, depending on which body is under review. The strong 
criticism of the treaty bodies by states is attributed to their positions as independent, non-
political features of the UN system,47 which seems contrary to the basic premise of 
international law as a body of law created and governed by states. Lijnzaad counters that it is 
the dynamic force of the international human rights system and functions of the treaty bodies 
that will ultimately lead to new rules related to treaty observance.48 It is the supervisory side 
of reciprocity that ultimately concerns human rights treaties as the mutuality of obligation 
and exercise of mutual limitations pursuant to reservations are absent, which is where treaty 
bodies can fill a gap. 
 
1.3 Reservations to Human Rights49 
For those who contend that human rights treaties should not cause any greater difficulty than 
other types of treaties in the wake of applying the Vienna Convention reservations rules it is 
worth noting why reservations to human rights obligations lend themselves to confusion. It is 
generally accepted that the law of treaties is premised on reciprocal contractual relationships 
between State Parties.50 However, because human rights treaties embody obligations towards 
individuals, whose well-being is the responsibility of the state, rather than obligations 
between State Parties, there has been a general apathy by states in their duty to guard the 
                                                          
46 Philip Alston, “The Historical Origins of the Concept of “General Comments” in Human Rights Law”, in H.J. 
Steiner, P. Alston and R. Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd ed, 
2008) pp. 873-76; Philip Alston, “Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into Prospective”, in 
P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (2000) pp. 501-25; Patrick 
J. Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions (1998). For a discussion particularly in the context 
of reservations, see Viljam Engström, Understanding Powers of International Organizations (2009), part IV. 
47 See, for example, discussion by Hilary Charlesworth, “The United Nation’s Human Rights System”, in C. 
Reus-Smit (ed.), Keynote 05: The Challenge of UN Reform (2005). 
48 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 79. 
49 Unless otherwise noted, all reservations presented in the section can be found online in the United Nations 
Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org (UN Treaty Collection), Status of Treaties, treaty name, 
state. 
50 Swaine, “Reserving”, 342; Redgwell, “The Law or Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, 18; 
Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 65-72; Imbert, “Reservations and Human Rights 
Conventions”, 33. 
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integrity of these instruments.51 Where states anticipate difficulty in guaranteeing every 
article of a human rights treaty the possibility of making reservations presents the opportunity 
for them to join the treaty without being held responsible for compliance with the agreement 
in its entirety.52 As noted by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), full compliance is more 
desirable ‘because the human rights norms are the legal expression of the essential rights that 
every person is entitled to as a human being’.53 Acknowledging that reservations facilitate 
agreement on many levels, it has also been suggested that they splinter multilateral 
agreements into a network of bilateral and plurilateral agreements.54 Though true when 
considering general multilateral treaties, the picture is not entirely accurate in the context of 
human rights treaties. The beneficiaries of human rights treaties are people, not states, thus 
there are no revised reciprocal agreements and states will not treat reserving states differently 
from non-reserving states. 
 
Conceding that the practice of making reservations cannot be entirely eliminated it is 
important to understand how various types of reservations to human rights treaties work in 
practice within the current international regime. Practice has shown that acceptance of 
reservations to human rights treaties is entirely by tacit acceptance, not by a positive 
statement of acceptance.55 Tension exists where a reservation has been both the subject of an 
objection and an acceptance by tacit acceptance. International law is ‘characteristically 
diffident as to the peculiarities of human rights conventions as a specific class of treaties’56 
                                                          
51 Noted by Theo van Boven, member of CERD in the forward of Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights 
Treaties, v-vi. 
52 Jeremy McBride, “Reservations and the Capacity to Implement Human Rights Treaties”. in J.P. Gardner (ed.), 
Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out: Reservations and Objections to Human Rights 
Conventions (1997), pp. 120-184. 
53 Human Rights Council (HRC), General Comment No. 24, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 4. 
54 Hylton, “Default Breakdown”, 440. 
55 HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 17. This point is also clear from even a cursory 
examination of reservations and objections to any of the core human rights treaties. 
56 Matthew Craven, “Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law”, 
11 EJIL (2000) pp. 489, 492. 
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despite the fact that international human rights law is generally accepted to be a distinct sub-
discipline of international law. This must be understood from both the point of view of the 
reserving state and the other State Parties, including those who object to a reservation. The 
interrelationships between the obligations, reservations and states’ treatment of both 
represents an amalgamation of rules of customary international law, treaty law, state practice, 
and, an aspect that must not be forgotten, international relations. Changing the domestic 
status quo is decidedly easier said than done. This is reflected by states in a multitude of 
situations including failure to ratify a treaty and anticipatory implementation problems as 
evidenced by reservations. A genuine conflict arises when states use reservations as a means 
of avoiding the obligations altogether.57 Recognising that the status quo is not easily changed, 
the overarching purpose of a human rights treaty is to advance these rights on the domestic 
level and this objective is clear to all potential State Parties from the outset thus change 
should be anticipated.    
 
Pursuant to the Vienna Convention, not all reservations are prohibited and states are free to 
make permissible reservations. Permissible reservations may, however, still be the subject of 
an objection though this may be a political objection rather than a substantive objection based 
on invalidity. It is objections to permissible reservations that are envisioned by Articles 20 
and 21. States often make reservations in order to bide time until changes on the domestic 
level can be implemented or to maintain specific features of domestic law. Provided there is 
ample specificity, these reservations will not necessarily offend the object and purpose of a 
treaty. The Vienna Convention only proscribes reservations which are prohibited by the 
treaty itself, reservations made contrary to a treaty provision indicating only specified 
reservations may be made and reservations which contravene the object and purpose of the 
                                                          
57 See, e.g., Yogesh K. Tyagi, “The Conflict of Law and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties”, 71 
BYBIL (2000) pp. 181, 209-12. 
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treaty.58 The initial and second conditions placed upon a state’s ability to make reservations 
are rather easily recognised and explicitly fail for want of compliance with the rules of treaty 
law as well as the treaty itself. It is the third condition provided by Article 19(c) of the 
Vienna Convention that breeds multifarious permutations of reservations that either blatantly 
contravene the object and purpose of a treaty—even in the eye of the most casual observer—
or that, prima facie, appear not to violate specific reservations rules but in practice present 
dilemmas as to actual obligations owed and, consequently, enforcement issues.   
 
In light of the different categories of rights, the application of specific types of reservations to 
the various rights reveals the interesting lacunae in reservations practice with respect to 
human rights. Initially there are those reservations which can easily be said to violate the 
object and purpose of a treaty and are the reservations to which objections are most often 
made. Two further detrimental categories of reservations to human rights treaties include 
those broad or vague references to application of a treaty only so far as it will be in concert 
with domestic law or local custom and those which subordinate specific obligation to existing 
domestic laws or customs. For clarity’s sake, the former category will be classified as 
‘sweeping’ reservations and the latter as ‘subordination’ reservations. The various assessment 
difficulties resulting from states’ reservation practices, however, are not limited to these two 
reservation categories. The following presents a text-based assessment of reservations 
juxtaposed against various rights and highlights how applying the Vienna Convention 
reservations rules to human rights treaties undermines the integrity of treaty law and the 
human rights regime. 
 
1.3.1 Permissible Reservations 
                                                          
58 Vienna Convention, Art. 19. 
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Though universal acceptance and implementation of all obligations set forth in human rights 
treaties is the goal to which the human rights movement aspires, the reality is that perfect 
compliance cannot always be immediately effected. Permissible reservations are those which 
do not offend Article 19 or any other provision of the convention that might render the 
reservation invalid. This accommodates reservations made by states which have legitimate 
domestic reasons for reserving against an obligation, such as the will of the domestic 
population or compliance with specific laws enacted by a legitimate, functioning government. 
 
The reservation made by Belize to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) Article 12(2) is a good model of this practice: ‘The Government of Belize reserves 
the right not to apply paragraph 2 of Article 12 in view of the statutory provisions requiring 
persons intending to travel abroad to furnish tax clearance certificates.’ Belize thus provides 
the precise domestic legal reason why it cannot comply with the obligation in full. The 
restriction is minimal and corresponds to a legislative measure in operation in the state. 
Austria also provides a succinct and detailed reservation to ICCPR Article 10(3) whereby it 
reserves the right to detain juvenile prisoners together with adults under 25 years of age who 
give no reason for concern as to their possible detrimental influence on the juvenile. Both 
examples are detailed enough to provide complete information as to how the state will 
comply with the obligation. In these instances, the State Party’s compliance is altered but the 
object and purpose of the treaty remains intact. 
 
1.3.2 Clearly Incompatible Reservations 
Though typically rare in other types of multilateral treaties, there are instances in the area of 
human rights treaties where a state formulates a reservation that is clearly incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty and is therefore impermissible. Such was the case with 
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one of the reservations made by Pakistan when it ratified the ICCPR on 23 June 2010. 
Among its reservations to nine articles of the ICCPR, Pakistan included the following 
reservation to Article 40: ‘The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereby 
declares that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in Article 
40 of the Covenant.’ Article 40 establishes the periodic reporting supervision of the HRC and 
outlines the requirements of the State Parties to submit reports. The establishment of the 
periodic reporting system is a core feature of the UN human rights treaty system therefore 
there can be no doubt as to the incompatibility of this reservation with the object and purpose 
of the treaty.59 As stated by Austria: 
 
…the Committee provided for in Article 40 of the Covenant has a pivotal role in 
the implementation of the Covenant. The exclusion of the competence of the 
Committee is not provided for in the Covenant and in Austria’s views 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.60 
 
Other objections61 echo the fundamental and essential role of the periodic reporting system in 
the implementation and overall operation of the ICCPR and question Pakistan’s commitment 
to the Covenant. 
 
Pakistan also reserved against Articles 6, 7 and 18, which according to ICCPR Article 4(2) 
are non-derogable; the non-derogability of the articles raises the spectre of incompatibility. 
The largest number of objections made to any reservation to the ICCPR was recorded against 
                                                          
59 A reservation to a provision concerning a monitoring body is not per se impermissible unless it negates the 
raison d’ȇtre of the treaty. See Guide to Practice, 3.1.5.7. 
60 UN Treaty Collection, ICCPR, Objection by Austria with regard to the reservations made by Pakistan (24 Jun. 
2011).  
61 UN Treaty Collection, ICCPR, Objections to Art. 40 by Pakistan by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. 
19 
 
Pakistan’s catalogue of reservations based on incompatibility with the object and purpose of 
the treaty,62 as well as against Pakistan’s similar reservations to CAT which met with almost 
identical tide of international rebuke.63 Even without the objections by states it would be 
difficult to argue that a reservation to ICCPR Article 40 is consistent with the object and 
purpose of the treaty. While the objecting states, in some instances, detailed their views on 
the legal effect of the reservations on state relations inter se, the Vienna Convention lacks any 
guidance on the consequence for such determinations of incompatibility when the benefits 
and obligations do not flow between State Parties. Following a great deal of diplomatic 
haranguing, Pakistan withdrew the reservation to Article 40, as well as a number of other 
reservations receiving adverse attention by other State Parties.  
 
1.3.3 Sweeping Reservations 
A frequently used reservation formula is a brief statement limiting the application of the 
treaty as a whole insofar as the obligations are compatible with domestic law or customs, 
including religious law. These are often referred to as ‘sweeping’ reservations.64 As noted by 
the ILC, states often put these forward to preserve the integrity of specific norms of their 
internal law despite the fact that reservations based on general reference to internal law, or 
sections of the law, make determining compatibility of the reservation with the treaty 
                                                          
62 UN Treaty Collection, ICCPR, objections to the reservations by Pakistan based on incompatibility with the 
object and purpose of the treaty: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US (including those objections filed outwith the twelve-month 
time-limit specified for notification of objections under Vienna Convention, Art. 20(5)). 
63 See UN Treaty Collection, Pakistan’s reservations to CAT and objections made by a multitude of states. 
64 The term “sweeping” used to identify this particular type of reservations is attributed to Redgwell, see 
Catherine Redgwell , “Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24(52)”, 
46 ICLQ (1997) pp. 390, 391, but is echoed by other writers including Hampson, 1999 Working paper, para. 
25(iii). Other authors have referred to this type of reservation as an “across-the-board” reservation, see, e.g., 
Karl Zemanek, “Alain Pellet’s Definition of a Reservation”, 3 Austrian Review of International & European 
Law (1998) pp. 295. The ILC also references the “across-the-board” reservation in its Guide to Practice, 1.1, 
commentary paras. 17-21. 
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impossible.65 Sweeping reservations prohibit any successful analysis by another State Party 
as to whether the reservation complies with the object and purpose of the treaty. These 
reservations effectively result in the reserving state taking on no actual international 
obligations, which is one of the serious problems with the practice.66  
 
El Salvador’s reservation to the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) represents a prime example of a sweeping reservation that thwarts any 
determination as to the extent to which it complies with the object and purpose of the treaty:  
 
The Government of the Republic of El Salvador signs the present …to the 
extent that its provisions do not prejudice or violate the provisions of any of the 
precepts, principles and norms enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of 
El Salvador, particularly in its enumeration of principles.67  
 
The indeterminate scope of such a reservation is unacceptable for many reasons but most 
importantly because it would be almost impossible for another State Party or a treaty body, 
not to mention a person subject to the jurisdiction of the author state, to ascertain precisely 
how the obligations will be recognised on the domestic level. A large percentage of 
reservations to human rights treaties rely precisely on broad reservations invoking general 
domestic laws as a commitment escape route. These sweeping reservations denote an 
                                                          
65 ILC, UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), 109; see also Karl Zemanek, “New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes 
Obligations”, [2000] Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2000) pp. 1, 4; Redgwell, “Reservations and 
General Comment No. 24(52)”, 397-98. The ILC addresses these types of reservations in Guide to Practice, 
3.1.5.2 (Vague or general reservations).  
66 HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), para. 12; See also Marks, “Three Regional Human Rights 
Treaties”, 61.  
67El Slavador, Reservations to the CRPD, UN Doc. A/61/611 (2006). Austria, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Sweden objected to El Salvador”s reservation. 
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apathetic approach to treaty observance and have been employed time and again by a 
multitude of State Parties to the core UN human rights treaties.   
 
Almost as frequent as the sweeping reservation limiting compliance as far as allowed by 
domestic law are reservations limiting application of all treaty obligations to the extent they 
are permitted by local customs or religious practices. Reservations based on traditional 
custom or religion are detrimental because they leave compliance up to the reserving state’s 
discretion.68 One example is Malawi’s original reservation to the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) indicating that it would 
not consider itself bound to certain articles of the Convention due to the deep-rooted nature of 
certain practices of Malawians where obligations would require immediate eradication of 
those traditional customs and practices. This sweeping reservation exemplified the indefinite 
nature of Malawi’s commitment to CEDAW. Fortunately, Malawi withdrew the reservation 
following Mexico’s objection noting that the reservation impaired the treaty’s purpose.   
 
In predominantly Islamic states a sweeping reservation will often employ domestic law in 
conjunction with religion as an exception to obligation implementation. Reservations made 
by Oman and Malaysia to CEDAW clearly illustrate the problematic vagueness intrinsic to 
sweeping reservations combining the two contingencies. The first of five reservations made 
by Oman indicates that it will reserve the application of ‘[a]ll provisions of the Convention 
not in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia and legislation in force in the 
Sultanate of Oman’. Any CEDAW State Party wishing to evaluate the reservation for 
purposes of objection would need to be well-versed in the intricacies of both Sharia and the 
                                                          
68 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 86. 
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laws of Oman in order to make an informed decision as to whether Oman is upholding its 
treaty obligations. An equally ambiguous reservation is that made by Malaysia to CEDAW:  
 
The Government of Malaysia declares that Malaysia’s accession (to CEDAW) 
is subject to the understanding that the provisions of the Convention do not 
conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia law and the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia. 
 
Malaysia went on to further outline that in light of this general reservation it was specifically 
not bound to a multitude of articles.69 In both instances, such sweeping references to general 
domestic law and Sharia law clearly cannot be viewed as an attempt to fulfil CEDAW gender 
equality commitments, especially when it has been acknowledged by Morocco, also a 
primarily Islamic country, that ‘[e]quality of this kind is considered incompatible with the 
Islamic Sharia.’  
 
While it has been argued that this type of reservation is not a true reservation,70 the reality is 
that it is precisely this formulation that is often used by states when ratifying human rights 
treaties. Sweeping reservations permeate the core treaties and there is a substantive quandary 
presented by sweeping reservations related to Islamic Sharia law as they specifically counter 
the main purpose of human rights treaties which is to identify universal international human 
rights standards.71 Sweeping reservations requiring compliance with domestic constitutions 
are no less problematic. Determining whether such reservations are compatible with the 
                                                          
69 Particularly Malaysia did not consider itself bound by the provisions of CEDAW Arts. 2(f), 9(1), 9(2), 
16(1)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g) or (h).  
70 Zemanek, “Alain Pellet”s Definition of a Reservation”, 296. Zemanek argues that by including this type of 
unilateral statement under the umbrella of “reservations” a false legitimacy is conferred where theoretically 
these statements are ipso facto incompatible with a standard setting convention. 
71 Anne F. Bayefsky, “Making Human Rights Treaties Work”, in R.P. Claude and B.H. Weston (eds.), Human 
Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (3rd ed., 2006) pp. 315-321, 319. 
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object and purpose of the treaty is all but impossible in these instances and is highly 
contingent on each treaty obligation in relation to every law, a potentially infinite number of 
tangents.  
 
1.3.4 Subordination of International Obligations 
In addition to sweeping reservations, another common reservation formula entails 
reservations subordinating specific treaty obligations to domestic law and represents another 
defeatist reservation practice that weakens human rights treaties. This practice is an on-going 
challenge due in large part to the uncertainty inherent in some domestic systems and their 
lackadaisical approach to recognition of international obligations and it contributes to the 
reservations chasm. Vienna Convention Article 27 specifically provides that ‘[a] party may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’; 
thus when reservation is so imprecise in its reference to internal law as to make the extent of 
the reservation unascertainable, objecting states will invoke Article 27 in addition to 
incompatibility under Article 19(c). Though reliance on Article 27 as a basis for objecting to 
a reservation is contested,72 it is worth noting that it is not an uncommon practice.73  
 
Subordination reservations effectively water down the reserving state’s obligations and, 
depending on the actual realisation of the obligation on the domestic level, could equate to 
non-performance of treaty obligations. Reservations invoking internal law are not 
automatically impermissible and are, in some cases, necessary,74 as detailed above in Section 
1.3.1. However, these policy decisions evidence the fact that states are wary of commitments 
                                                          
72 Guide to Practice, 3.1.5.5, commentary, esp. para. 4. 
73 See e.g., UN Treaty Collection, ICCPR, objections to reservations made by Pakistan by Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, and Greece; see also Françoise Hampson, Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues, Reservations to Human 
Rights Treaties, Final working paper, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (2004) (2004 Final Working paper), 
para. 56. 
74 Guide to Practice, 3.1.5.5. 
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that would necessitate changes to their constitutions or existing laws when in reality if 
becoming a State Party in both name and practice was truly the ambition of a government it 
would push through the necessary changes prior to ratification.75 Otherwise, the state’s 
participation in the treaty is likely more a mere formality rather than an attempt to bring its 
legal system into conformity with the treaty.76 
 
Fiji’s reservation to Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) presents a common example of a subordination reservation and illustrates disregard 
for adherence to the Vienna Convention principles: 
 
To the extent, if any, that any law relating to elections in Fiji may not fulfil the 
obligations referred to in Article 5 (c), that any law relating to land in Fiji which 
prohibits or restricts the alienation of land by the indigenous inhabitants may not 
fulfil the obligations referred to in Article 5 (d) (v), or that the school system of 
Fiji may not fulfil the obligations referred to in Articles 2, 3, or 5 (e) (v), the 
Government of Fiji reserves the right not to implement the aforementioned 
provisions of the Convention. 
 
Under the umbrella of this reservation, Fiji may still discriminate based on race in the areas 
of elections, alienation of land and in the school system. In this example, Fiji does not 
contemplate a future change in the law and appears unwilling to entertain progressive 
development in these areas though it clearly recognises the opportunity to do so as reflected 
in another reservation it made to CERD.  
 
                                                          
75 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 78. 
76 Imbert, “Reservations and Human Rights Conventions”, 28.  
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In theory, this problem should be dealt with by enacting the appropriate laws on the domestic 
level in order to provide at least the minimum protections set forth in the relevant treaty. 
When this objective is not achieved, however, it is more a wait-and-see approach that must be 
taken. Issues of compatibility are not always initially obvious and this is true in all legal 
systems. Reservations subordinating obligations to domestic law create a ‘smoke screen’ 
between the treaty bodies and actual implementation on the domestic level.77   
 
Some subordination reservations will be in place only as long as it takes the state to enact the 
appropriate domestic measures to bring the law into conformity with international 
obligations, sometimes referred to as a ‘transitional’78 reservation. Barbados’ reservation to 
the ICCPR exemplifies this particular situation:  
 
The Government of Barbados states that it reserves the right not to apply in full, 
the guarantee of free legal assistance in accordance with paragraph 3 (d) of 
Article 14 of the Covenant, since, while accepting the principles contained in the 
same paragraph, the problems of implementation are such that full application 
cannot be guaranteed at present.  
 
By its reservation Barbados intimates that at some point in the future it will pursue full 
implementation of Article 14. 79 Redgwell notes that:  
 
A temporary derogation from the full rights and obligations of the State under 
the treaty pending the realignment of national law does not fall foul of the basic 
                                                          
77 Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, 88. 
78 Elena A. Baylis, “General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties”, 
17 Berkeley Journal of International Law (1999) pp. 277, 311. 
79 It must be noted, however, that Barbados acceded to the ICCPR in 1973 but has yet to withdraw this 
reservation. 
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international law prohibitions, embodied in Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention, against invoking the provisions of internal law as justification for 
the failure to perform international obligations…80 
 
Legislation on the domestic level is traditionally outside the scope of international law though 
pursuant to the obligations set forth by human rights treaties there is a positive obligation on 
State Parties to develop new laws or repeal existing laws in order to bring domestic law into 
conformity with the international agreement. This positive obligation is increasingly 
monitored as the number of regulatory treaties grows.81 Subordinating international 
obligations to domestic law creates a ping-pong effect where the right is volleyed perpetually 
between the level of an international obligation and potential recognition on the domestic 
level. 
 
Federal states typically make reservations subordinating treaty obligations to domestic law in 
light of the restricted federal-state system.82 As indicated by the United States in one of its 
reservations to the ICCPR, the federal government only obligates itself to the extent that it 
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the treaty. Covenant 
obligations are otherwise left to the state and local governments to implement. The difficulty 
with this type of subordination is that the bound party is the US federal government, not the 
federated states.83  
                                                          
80 Redgwell, “Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)”, 400. 
81 On the increase in international regulatory treaties directly impacting domestic law see Jacob Katz Cogan, 
“The Regulatory Turn in International Law”, 52 Harvard International Law Journal (2011) pp. 321. 
82 The problematic situation with distribution of powers between the federal government and state governments 
in the context of international obligations has been the subject of prior international disputes as noted in 
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, pp. 466. 
83 For an overview of the US position see Bradley and Goldsmith, “Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional 
Consent”; Stephanie Grant, “The United States and the International Human Rights Treaty System: For Export 
Only”, in P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (2000) pp. 317-
29; David P. Stewart, “U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the 
Reservations, Understanding and Declarations”, 14 Human Rights Law Journal (1993) pp. 77; for a discussion 
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As one of the most latterly convened treaties, the CRPD picked up on the federal state 
reservations to previous conventions and explicitly included in Article 4(5) that all provisions 
‘extend to all parts of federal states without any limitations or exceptions’. This purports to 
take a strong stance against those states relying on the excuse that certain obligations are not 
supervised on the federal level; however, the reality seems to be that there is little that can be 
done to alter the practical implications of the federal system in light of these types of 
reservations as the issue is really one that must be dealt with on the domestic level. 
 
1.3.5 Numerous Reservations to a Single Treaty 
It is not merely sweeping or incompatible reservations based on general references to 
domestic laws that are a concern. State Parties who record a high number of reservations to 
specific rights due to incompatibility with identifiable domestic laws or local customs 
demonstrates an unwillingness to entertain progressive human rights. Because human rights 
treaties contain multifarious obligations, in applying the object and purpose test it is often 
difficult to tell exactly which obligation will tip the scale in the event that a reservation is 
made against it. Even more difficult is assessing at what point a large number of otherwise 
marginal reservations will, by the sum of their parts, violate the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  
 
The Republic of Niger demonstrates the multiple reservations practice by making such a 
large number of obligation specific reservations to CEDAW that it creates a serious threat to 
the realisation of Convention rights and prompts the question, why join? CEDAW Article 28 
prohibits reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; yet more 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the US approach to reservations to a non-human rights treaty, see, Gregory F. Jacob, “Without Reservation”, 
5 Chicago Journal of International Law (2004-05) pp. 287. 
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reservations have been made to it than any other human rights convention. The object and 
purpose test assesses individual reservations. The Vienna Convention does not address the 
case of multiple reservations defeating the object and purpose of a treaty as a result of their 
collective effect. Niger reserved against eighteen CEDAW commitments pointing to its 
‘regard to the modification of social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women’. 
The state indicated that the articles reserved against were contrary to the existing customs and 
practices within the country which could be modified only with the passage of time and the 
evolution of society and, therefore, could not be abolished by an act of authority. Article 5 of 
CEDAW specifically identifies the purpose of the treaty is: 
 
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.   
 
With the purpose of CEDAW being the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women, reserving against a large number of the commitments does nothing to support 
Niger’s status as a State Party as it appears to exist only in name. Niger’s b avoidance  of 
CEDAW aims was challenged through objections by both France and the Netherlands.84 The 
objections have thus far had no effect on the government of Niger as it appears that its only 
commitment is the perpetual non-attainment of gender equality.  
 
In 1987 and 1992, CEDAW Committee General Recommendations addressed the acute 
problem with reservations to the Convention in light of the perceived invalidity and 
                                                          
84 UN Treaty Collection, CEDAW, End Note, Objections to Reservations made by Niger to CEDAW by France, 
14 Nov. 2000, and Netherlands, 6 Dec. 2000.   
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detrimental legal effect of a large number of the existing reservations.85 Urging states to 
evaluate the reservations of other States Parties and reconsider their own reservations, the 
Committee suggested a move toward a common procedure on reservations commensurate 
with other human rights treaties.86 Unfortunately, the other core human rights treaties appear 
to be in the same situation. 
 
A better approach is that taken by Chile in its declaration made upon signing CEDAW in 
1980 where it contended that at the current time many provisions of CEDAW were not 
compatible with Chilean legislation but that it had established a law reform committee to 
assist in rectifying the incompatible terms. Chile did not ratify the Convention until 1989 but 
when it did it made no reservations indicating persisting incompatibility issues. 
 
1.4 ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties 
Prior to the 2011 Guide to Practice, the ILC considered reservations to treaties on four 
occasions including in 1951 in association with the Genocide Advisory Opinion and within 
the framework of developing the 1969 Vienna Convention, 1978 Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties87 and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations88. Beginning in 1993, under the leadership of Special Rapporteur Alain 
Pellet,89 the ILC launched an in-depth analysis of the existing reservations system under the 
Vienna Convention and how the opportunity to make reservations fit into the overall 
                                                          
85 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 2, Reservations to the Convention, UN Doc. A/42/38 
(1987) and General Recommendation No. 20, Reservations to the Convention, UN Doc. A/47/38 (1992). 
86 UN Doc. A/47/38 (1992), para. 2. 
87 1946 UNTS 3, 23 Aug. 1978. 
88 UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15, 21 Mar. 1986 (not yet in force). 
89 Pellet was appointed to undertake the task in 1994, see ILC Yearbook 1994, vol. II (Part Two), UN Doc. 
A/49/10 (1994), p. 179, para. 381. 
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effectiveness of international treaties.90 Particularly the ILC indicated that it would attempt to 
clarify the special position of human rights treaties within the regulatory framework of the 
Vienna Convention’s reservations system.91 
 
From the outset of the study the major problem was noted as the reconciliation of two 
imperatives: ‘the need to maintain the essential elements of the treaty on the one hand, and 
the need to facilitate as far as possible accession to multilateral treaties of general interest,’92 
thus the integrity versus universality conflict shaped much of the early debate. The project 
was not envisioned as a complete redraft of the Vienna Convention but was driven by the 
necessity to fill the existing lacunae in contemporary treaty law as well as to give guidance on 
related issues, such as interpretative declarations.93 The ILC indicated early in its work that 
they would not call into question the 1969, 1978 or 1986 Vienna Conventions,94 but would 
try and fill the obvious gaps and ambiguities by providing a ‘Guide to Practice’ with 
guidelines and model clauses that could be used in tandem with the existing rules on treaty 
law in the development of future treaties.95 
 
In 2007, despite having formulated a large number of the draft guidelines Pellet sought, for 
the second time, the input of states on the question of reservations. Particularly he questioned 
what conclusions states drew in the event that a reservation was deemed invalid due to 
contravention of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention and whether states favoured the 
                                                          
90 ILC Yearbook 1993, vol. II (Part Two) UN Doc. A/48/10 (1993), para. 440.  
91 Alain Pellet, First report on the law and practice relating to reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/470 
(1995), paras. 138-42.  
92 ILC, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 413.  
93 Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5, UN Doc. A/CN.4/572 (2006), para. 4. 
94 See, e.g., ILC, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), paras. 428, 430; ILC Yearbook 1997, UN. Doc. A/52/10 (1997), 
para. 157; ILC, UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998), para. 482; ILC, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2009), para 53. 
95 ILC, UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998), para. 482.  
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severability doctrine, the opposability doctrine or a combination of the two.96 It further asked 
states to provide the legal or practical considerations for the response to the initial set of 
questions. The third question posed to the states was framed as follows: Do the replies to the 
above two sets of questions vary (or should they vary) according to the type of treaty 
concerned (bilateral or normative, human rights, environmental protection, codification, 
etc.)? This question attempted to elicit some information on the plausibility of separate 
specialised reservations regimes; however, the responses were less than illuminating. 97 The 
combined lethargy of state responses to the ILC effort to clarify reservations practice 
supports the assertion made above that states prefer imprecision when it comes to 
reservations. The remainder of this article outlines the ILC guidance on the problems 
prevailing when applying the Vienna Convention reservations rules to human rights treaties, 
as introduced above in Section 1.2. 
 
1.4.1 The Object and Purpose Test Remains 
Despite the fact that years of debate has not shed any further light on the application of the 
Vienna Convention rules, the ILC maintains that the object and purpose test should remain.98 
Pellet went as far as to try and distil a ‘method’ for employing the test pursuant to ICJ 
interpretations of the test through the years in an attempt to provide guidance on determining 
the object and purpose of a treaty. Noting that this ‘method’ is at best disparate in its 
                                                          
96 UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), para. 23(a), the questionnaire did not use the terms severability or opposability but 
instead outlined the consequences of both. 
97 As of July 2010, only thirty-three states had responded to the questionnaire and those responding were mainly 
European or Western states. UN Doc. A/65/10 (2010), p. 10, fn. 13.  The questionnaire was directed both to 
states and international organisations serving as depositaries for multilateral treaties, however, because the focus 
of research deals specifically with reservations to UN human rights treaties, which are open only to states, the 
discussion is limited to responses by states though the percentage of responses was much higher from the 
organisations. 
98 See, e.g., the confirmation of the Vienna Convention regime throughout the development of the study on 
Reservations to Treaties: Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 45th Session. Yearbook 
of the ILC 1993, vol. II (Part Two), UN Doc. A/48/10 (1993), para. 440; Report of the ILC on the work of its 
50th session, ILC Yearbook 1998, vol. II (Part Two), UN Doc. A/53/10 (1998), para. 482; Report of the ILC on 
the work of its 61st session, ILC Yearbook 2009, vol. II (Part Two), UN Doc. A/64/10 (2009), para 53. 
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application by the Court, he also points out that it is largely based on empirical data from the 
treaty in question and includes such obvious considerations as the title, the preamble, the 
introductory articles, articles that demonstrate the major concerns of the Contracting Parties, 
the preparatory work and the overall framework of the treaty,99 as reflected in the Guide to 
Practice.100 While it is undoubtedly correct that the object and purpose ‘can be determined 
only by reference to the text and particular nature of a treaty’ and that there is ‘some degree 
of subjectivity’ in each case that must be limited,101 the Guide to Practice provides no more 
than a recapitulation of what has gone before.  
The situation is decidedly more bleak when the object and purpose test is applied to human 
rights treaties. A study commissioned by the human rights treaty bodies supplements the ILC 
guidance on determining the object and purpose. Hampson designates three considerations as 
important when determining compatibility of a reservation to a human rights treaty using the 
object and purpose test: (1) the relationship between separate articles and the whole treaty, 
(2) the alleged jus cogens character of some of the norms, and (3) the distinction between 
derogable and non-derogable rights.102 These additions to Pellet’s method track the consistent 
statements of the treaty bodies in their evaluations of reservations. Hampson103 and the treaty 
bodies104 ultimately deferred to Pellet in anticipation of him developing a way to apply the 
object and purpose test to a human rights treaty. Unfortunately, this special test did not 
materialise.  
                                                          
99 Pellet, Tenth report on Reservations, para. 81. 
100 Guide to Practice, 3.1.5.1 and commentary. 
101 Note by the Special Rapporteur on draft guideline 3.1.5, UN Doc. A/CN.4/572 (2006), para. 5. 
102 Hampson, 2004 Final Working paper, para. 49. These considerations are reflected in the Guide to Practice 
under paras. 3.1.5.6 (relationship of separate articles) and 3.1.5.4 (derogability). The commentary to 3.2.5.3, 
para. 14, indicates that the ILC did not feel it necessary to draft a guideline specifically on reservations to jus 
cogens norms.  
103 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 72. 
104 Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Report on their nineteenth meeting: Report of the sixth 
inter-committee meeting of human rights treaty bodies, UN Doc. A/62/224 (2007), para. 16(6). 
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Despite the ILC’s inability to produce a definition for the object and purpose test, for a 
moment there was a nod of consideration extended to human rights treaties in the preparation 
of the Guide to Practice: 
 
3.1.12 Reservations to general human rights treaties (draft guideline) 
To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a 
general treaty for the protection of human rights, account shall be taken of the 
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of the rights set out in the 
treaty as well as the importance that the right or provision which is the subject 
of the reservation has within the general thrust of the treaty, and the gravity of 
the impact the reservation has upon it.105 
 
As noted by the original commentary on this guideline, Pellet uses the three elements most 
often deemed indicative of a human rights treaty—indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness—in an attempt to strike a delicate balance between the right that is the 
subject of the reservation and the effect that a reservation to the provision produces, including 
the impact of the reservation.106 In a nutshell, states should consider the fact that a human 
rights treaty is a human rights treaty. This draft guideline specifically addressing reservations 
to human rights treaties was replaced by final guideline 3.1.5.6 which expunged direct 
reference to human rights treaties opting, instead, for more general terms and urging 
consideration of the specifics of the treaty under review. Bearing in mind the vast number of 
reminders about the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights as 
well as the importance of the rights addressed and the negative effect that certain reservations 
might produce, the guidelines are not particularly instructive even if well-intended.  
                                                          
105 Original text adopted at the 59th session of the ILC, ILC Yearbook, UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), p. 65. 
106 Original text adopted at the 59th session of the ILC, ILC Yearbook, UN Doc. A/62/10 (2007), p. 113, 
Commentary on Draft Guideline 3.1.12 on Reservations to Treaties. 
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1.4.2 Defining the Legal Effect of an Invalid Reservation 
The uncertainty about how to apply the object and purpose bleeds into the next critical 
difficulty in the application of the Vienna Convention reservations rules to human rights 
treaties. The lack of determinable legal effect of an invalid reservation represents another gap 
in the reservations rules as there is no clear guide about how to categorise the legal effect of 
an invalid or impermissible reservation. If a reservation is invalid for structural or procedural 
deficiencies, the issue can be dispensed with more easily as it cannot be ‘established’ and 
therefore cannot have legal effect pursuant to Vienna Convention Article 21. Impermissible 
reservations—those failing the object and purpose test—however, present a more difficult 
problem due to the imprecise nature of the test as noted above. Though the primary concern 
of this section is reservations that are impermissible specifically due to incompatibility with 
Article 19(c), the problem of determinable legal effect in the context of reservations to human 
rights treaties is also prevalent for sweeping  reservations and reservations that subordinate 
international obligations to domestic law, both of which have been acknowledged to be 
contrary to Article 19(c) (impermissible) as well as structurally deficient (invalid) due to the 
indeterminable scope and breadth. 
 
Article 21 of the Vienna Convention specifically addresses the legal effect of a valid 
reservation and its modification of treaty relations between the reserving state and another 
State Party based on its acceptance or objection thereto.107 The article is premised on the fact 
that the reservation is valid as the ability of states to object to valid reservations is the 
political feature of the flexible reservations regime. There is no firm position on the legal 
effect of an invalid reservation in the Vienna Convention. The travaux preparatoires of the 
                                                          
107 Ineta Ziemele and Lāsma Liede, “Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: From Draft Guideline 3.1.12 to 
Guideline 3.1.5.6”, 24 EJIL (2013) pp. 1135, 1142. N.B. this article does not address the separate issue of the 
effect of an acceptance or objection of a reservation on the reserving state’s consent to be bound to the treaty.   
35 
 
Vienna Convention do not make clear whether a reservation which has ‘fallen at the hurdle of 
Article 19(c) because of incompatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention is 
nonetheless open to acceptance or rejection by States under Article 20(4).’108 According to 
the ILC, a reservation can only have a legal effect if it is established, which means that the 
reservation is valid (and permissible) and has been accepted109 otherwise it is a nullity.110 In 
other words, the legal effect is established between the reserving and accepting state to the 
extent the treaty obligations are modified or excluded (released from compliance)111 inter se 
to the extent of the reservation.112 Alternatively, between the reserving and objecting state the 
treaty obligations which are subject to the reservation will not be applicable between the two 
or the convention will be applicable in its entirety between the two—the ‘super-maximum 
effect’113—if the objecting state has so indicated. Thus, a reservation’s legal effect, or lack of 
legal effect, under the Vienna Convention rules is based on the reaction, whether an 
acceptance or objection, by another State Party. For the purposes of examining legal effect in 
this section there is an assumption that a state has taken a view that a formulated reservation 
is invalid.   
 
Under the Vienna Convention regime, if multiple states object to a reservation on the basis of 
invalidity or impermissibility, the fall-out for the reserving state will be tangible as it would 
be unlikely that the reserving state would be able to maintain the invalid reservation due to 
the reciprocal nature of rights and responsibilities reflected in most treaties. The same cannot 
be said of normative human rights treaties; the international obligations contained therein 
                                                          
108 Redgwell, “The Law on Reservations in Respect of Multilateral Conventions”, 8; see also Redgwell, 
“Universality or Integrity?”, 259 et seq. 
109 Reflecting the principle set out in Vienna Convention 21(1)(a). See also, Guide to Practice, 4.1. 
110 Guide to Practice, 4.5.1: ‘[a] reservation that does not meet the conditions of formal validity and 
permissibility…is null and void, and therefore devoid of legal effect.’ See also, Swaine, “Reserving”, 315; 
Bowett, “Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties”, 75 et seq. 
111 N.B. this article does not examine the difference in effects created by modifying and excluding reservations. 
112 Guide to Practice, 4.2.4. 
113 Guide to Practice, 2.6.1, commentary paras. 24, 25. 
36 
 
create a state-human being relationship and human beings do not get a look-in at the treaty 
formation process. The state-human being relationship114 suffers detriment because 
individuals are unable to invoke the legal effect flowing normally from the traditional 
concept of reciprocity. Thus a determination of invalidity under the Vienna Convention 
system deprives the beneficiary of a human rights treaty from any benefit or redress such as 
that enjoyed among State Parties.115 This is an unintended effect of investing human beings 
with rights under international law. The reserving state is the only party to enjoy the benefit 
of the reservation as the legal effect is only applicable to itself. The state-human being 
relationship is at the mercy of the state-to-state relationship that the Vienna Convention 
falsely assumes to be important in a human rights treaty. 
 
The potential legal effect of a sweeping reservation poses an immeasurable threat to human 
rights treaties. There is little to remedy the effect of sweeping reservations which could 
deprive the treaty of its object and purpose primarily because it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which obligations are modified by these reservations. There are a number of such 
reservations to which no objections have been made thus, in theory, the reserving state has 
modified all aspects of the treaty which fall under the reservation and these effects could be 
enjoyed reciprocally by an accepting state. This potential situation results from the 
establishment of the reservation through tacit acceptance, or silence, on the part of other State 
Parties.116 As noted by Boerefijn, ‘the ILC’s primary concern about vague and general 
reservations is that these cause problems for other contracting states in assessing the extent to 
                                                          
114 e.g., in the Guide to Practice, 4.2.5, commentary para. 4, recognising the existence of the ‘state-person’ 
relationship in human rights treaties. 
115 Ziemele and Liede, “Reservations to Human Rights Treaties”, 1142. 
116 Vienna Convention, Art. 20(5). 
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which the reserving state is bound’ but it avoids addressing the consequences for the human 
beings affected by a reservation.117  
 
Reservations that subordinate international obligations to domestic laws also create a problem 
as to the determinable effect of the reservation on the obligation. Vienna Convention Article 
27 prohibits states from using internal law as a justification for failing to perform a treaty. 
Most authors employ Article 27 specifically in response to states attempting to use overly-
broad references to internal law as a cover for not actually accepting new obligations.118 The 
ILC points out that it should ‘be borne in mind that national laws are “merely facts” from the 
standpoint of international law and that the very aim of a treaty can be to lead States to 
modify them.’119 Once again, applying the object and purpose test is difficult for State Parties 
if they are unfamiliar, which will most likely be the case, with the domestic laws of the 
reserving state. Therefore, the Vienna Convention’s in-built state policing system is 
underutilised and a great number of these reservations remain attached to the core human 
rights treaties.  
 
The ILC suggests that reciprocity of legal effects may serve as a deterrent role because a 
reserving state ‘runs the risk of the reservation being invoked against it’ and thus this helps 
resolve the tension between flexibility and integrity.120 This suggestion is moot, however, in 
the context of a human rights treaty as never has state attempted to invoke reciprocity of legal 
effect in relation to a reservation under this category of treaty. The Guide to Practice attempts 
to address the legal effects of treaties embodying non-reciprocal obligations: 
  
                                                          
117 Boerefijn, “Impact on the Law on Treaty Reservations”, p. 95. 
118 Hampson, 2004 Final working paper, para. 56. 
119 Guide to Practice, 3.1.5.5, commentary para. 5. 
120 Guide to Practice, 4.2.4, commentary para. 31. 
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4.2.5 Non-reciprocal application of obligations to which a reservation relates 
Insofar as the obligations under the provisions to which the reservation relates 
are not subject to reciprocal application in view of the nature of the obligations 
or the object and purpose of the treaty, the content of the obligations of the 
parties other than the author of the reservation remains unaffected. The content 
of the obligations of those parties likewise remains unaffected when reciprocal 
application is not possible because of the content of the reservation. 
 
This attempt, however, only underscores that fact that treaties embodying non-reciprocal 
obligations are different while doing nothing to remedy the lack of concrete effect. As noted 
in the commentary, the nature of human rights obligations do not engage the concept of 
reciprocity among the State Parties and therefore the only logical conclusion even in the 
absence of the guideline is that an accepting (most likely in the form of tacit acceptance) 
State Party would not seek to limit its obligations to the extent that the reserving state has 
done. 121 Logic, however, does not clarify the legal effect of sweeping reservations or 
reservations that subordinate obligations to domestic law as there is no guidance on how to 
assess their validity outwith the normal state-to-state application of the Vienna Convention 
rules. 
 
To rectify questions about tacit acceptance, which is the primary way that invalid reservations 
have become ‘valid’, the Guide points out that an individual state’s acceptance of an 
impermissible reservation is a nullity.122 Hampson also concludes that states may not 
formulate reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of a human rights 
                                                          
121 Guide to Practice, 4.2.5, commentary para. 4. 
122 Guide to Practice, 3.3.3. 
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treaty nor could incompatible reservations be accepted.123 This is in line with the view 
advanced by the ILC throughout the Guide to Practice. The ILC insistence that acceptance, 
even of an invalid reservation, is a nullity is, however, practically inoperable as it fails to 
recognise the contemporary practice that the state initially determines permissibility under 
Article 19(c) unless an alternative rule requires otherwise. Even noting the ‘impossibility’124 
of accepting an impermissible reservation there is nothing outlined to counter the fact that by 
virtue of tacit acceptance, just this situation has arisen despite the ILC claim that acceptance 
cannot change impermissibility.125 Furthermore, this position lacks a basis in customary 
international law as noted by Germany in its response to the draft guidelines on 
reservations.126  
 
The hard and fast nullity proposition posited by both the ILC and Hampson is actually 
contradicted after its laborious introduction in the Guide to Practice. The Guide suggests that 
the question is unsettled as to whether collective acceptance could render an impermissible 
reservation permissible.127 If all of the parties to the treaty envision an amendment to the 
treaty which would mitigate the intervening impermissibility, the option already exists under 
Vienna Convention Article 39128 and need not be addressed as part of the reservations 
regime. Over the years, the lack of settled approach has led some to call for an advisory 
                                                          
123 Françoise Hampson, Specific Human Rights Issues, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Expanded 
working paper prepared in accordance to Sub-Commission decision 2001/17, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.2 (2003), p. 19. 
124 Guide to Practice, 3.3.3, commentary para. 4.  
125 Guide to Practice, 3.3.3.  
126 See comments by Germany, ILC, Reservations to treaties, Comments and observations received from 
Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), paras. 127-28. 
127 Guide to Practice, 3.3.3, commentary para. 8. 
128 Art. 39: General rule regarding the amendment of treaties provides: “A treaty may be amended by agreement 
between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II apply to such an agreement except in so far as the treaty may 
otherwise provide.” 
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opinion by the ICJ on the issue of the ability of states to accept impermissible reservations, 
though to date this idea has not come to fruition.129  
 
State practice has developed two primary approaches addressing the legal effect of 
reservations, the principles of permissibility and opposability. In early reports on reservations 
Pellet suggested that regardless of whether the permissibility or opposability doctrine was 
applied, the reserving state could not invoke an impermissible reservation to produce a legal 
effect: in the first instance, because the permissibility principle was based on the fact that an 
impermissible reservation is null and void regardless of the view of other states while under 
the opposability doctrine the reserving state could not invoke an impermissible reservation 
even if it had been accepted.130 Either way, both doctrines proceed from the idea that a 
reservation that violates the object and purpose test is null and void regardless of state 
response and can, therefore, have no legal effect. In theory, the only difference between the 
doctrines occurs when the reservation is valid and therefore the state-to-state relationships 
will be modified in different ways.  
 
The prevailing opinion of the ILC and treaty bodies131 suggests that no invalid reservation 
can create a legal effect that would modify or exclude otherwise binding obligations.132 
Regardless of the reaction, or inaction, of a state to an impermissible reservation, the Guide 
commentary reiterates that the view taken by a state on the reservation—holding the 
reservation impermissible or permissible—will not prevent the reservation from being 
                                                          
129 Redgwell, “Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)”, 410, citing R. Jacobson, “The Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women”, in P. Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights 
(1992), p. 469; Schabas, “Time for Innovation and Reform”, 78. 
130 ILC Yearbook 1995, UN Doc. A/50/10 (1995), para. 418. 
131 Chairpersons of the HRTBs, 2007 Report on Reservations, para. 16(7). 
132 Guide to Practice, 4.5.2. 
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subjected to other normal mechanisms of review.133 The problem with this idea is that a 
cyclical argument is advanced by the Guide. An impermissible reservation is a nullity without 
regard to state acceptance or objection but determination of impermissibility is a competence 
shared equally by states, dispute resolution mechanisms and treaty bodies.134 The opportunity 
for different bodies to assess permissibility seems to negate the idea that impermissibility 
exists without regard to state opinion or, at the very least, it minimises the role of states. 
Redgwell has commented that it precisely the lack of ‘a treaty mechanism for determining 
compatibility…or a supervisory organ competent to determine validity’ which perpetuates 
‘the general inertia of States manifesting itself in tacit acceptance ensur[ing] that reserving 
States become parties to treaties even in circumstances where they have formulated 
incompatible reservations’.135 As noted above, not all states accept the ILC’s assertion that an 
invalid reservation is a nullity that cannot be accepted as this has never been a confirmed rule 
under customary law136 and the state practice of maintaining invalid reservations clearly 
counters the idea of reservation nullity and embraces the principle that ‘a state cannot be 
bound without its consent’.137 
 
Whilst the ILC’s attempt to fill one of the major practical gaps in the Vienna is an ideal legal 
outcome for those opposed to invalid reservations to human rights treaties, neither the Vienna 
Convention, customary international law, the ILC Guide to Practice nor the work of the treaty 
bodies provide a clear answer. If the nullity of invalid reservations is such an obvious legal 
certainty then there should not be so many invalid reservations attached to the core human 
rights treaties. In the Guide to Practice, the issue of states’ objections to invalid reservations 
                                                          
133 Guide to Practice, 3.3.3, commentary para. 11. 
134 Guide to Practice, 3.2. 
135 Redgwell, “Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)”, 405-06. 
136 See comments by Germany in contrast to comments by Finland in ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), paras. 
127-28 and 129. 
137 Genocide Opinion, p. 21. 
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is ultimately wheedled down to serving the singular purpose of initiating a reservations 
dialogue and calling the invalidity to the attention of potential assessors of validity, including 
courts and treaty bodies. Thus it appears that the final word on legal effect of invalid 
reservations under the rules set forth in the Vienna Convention is that there is no final word. 
 
1.4.3 The Defined Consequence of an Invalid Reservation  
Reservation practice has reinforced that the legal effect between State Parties and the legal 
effect on the state-human being relationship created by human rights treaties are not one and 
the same. From a strict treaty law perspective the concern is not the state-human being 
relationship. However, if the ultimate point of a human rights treaty is to fortify this 
relationship, more consideration should be paid at the treaty law level. The present analysis is 
concerned with the actual legal effect, or more accurately the consequence, produced as a 
result of a determination of invalidity by other State Parties. Initially part four of the Guide to 
Practice points out that reservations ‘are defined in relation to the legal effect that their 
authors intend them to have on the treaty’138 despite the fact that the statement may not 
produce the intended legal effect.   
 
Guideline 4.5 introduces the topic of consequences of an invalid reservation. It is this 
particular aspect of the reservations rules that is ripe for the progressive development of law 
especially in light of the adverse effect on human rights treaties. The ILC acknowledges that 
the lack of consequences is ‘one of the most serious lacunae in the matter of reservations in 
the Vienna Conventions’.139 Though legal nullity is the desired consequence, particularly in a 
human rights treaty, the lack of finality on who decides permissibility destabilises the actual 
consequence intended by declaring a reservation a legal nullity. The ILC contends that nullity 
                                                          
138 Guide to Practice, 4, commentary para. 2. 
139 Guide to Practice, 4.5, commentary para. 16. 
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based on the impermissibility of a reservation is objective and not dependent on the reactions 
of other state parties,140 yet this only addresses the state-to-state relationship. Furthermore, it 
fails to recognise that the acceptance and objection interplay is the entire basis of the 
reservation monitoring system created by the Vienna Convention and precisely the reason 
why so many invalid reservations remain attached to the core human rights treaties today. 
States claim the right to determine validity yet in the case of the normative human rights 
treaties the status of reservations has proved to be unclear even when one or multiple states 
have objected to reservations on the basis of invalidity.141 The reserving state benefits from 
the presumption of validity and there is no legal imperative to withdraw a reservation deemed 
invalid by another state as it is highly unlikely that an objecting state will press the issue. 
 
The ILC’s cautious approach to impermissible reservations during the early years of its study 
favoured the objecting state and placed the onus upon the reserving state to take action to 
redress the inappropriate reservation such as modifying or withdrawing the reservation or 
relinquishing membership in the treaty altogether.142 The necessity of placing the burden on 
states to bring about a consequence, such as withdrawing the reservation, is because the 
Vienna Convention system lacks a control and annulment mechanism. Without an 
identifiable and tangible consequence the effect of the invalid reservation still hangs in the 
balance. As the Vienna Convention is silent on the issue of consequences, the potential to 
develop the subject should be viewed as an opportunity. More detailed rules on what happens 
to a reservation that has been declared invalid would go a long way toward rectifying the 
                                                          
140 Guide to Practice, 4.5.1, commentary para. 10.  
141 This stems largely from the fact that the reservations rules also represent a political feature to be optimised 
by states. 
142 Text of the Preliminary Conclusions of the ILC on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties Including 
Human Rights Treaties, Report of the ILC on the Work of its 49th Session, UN Doc. A/52/10 (1997), Ch. V, 
para. 86. See discussions by Roberto Baratta, “Should Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Be 
Disregarded?”, 11 EJIL (2000) pp. 413, 418-19; Redgwell, “Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)”, 
408. 
44 
 
ambiguity surrounding invalid reservations to the core human rights treaties. Presently, there 
exist two options establishing the legal consequence of an invalid reservation. The first is 
nullity which, as discussed above, results in the invalid reservation being void ab initio. 
Nullity by definition is both the legal effect and the consequence of an invalid reservation. 
Reiterating the argument above, the problem with nullity in the current context of the Vienna 
Convention regime is that the nullity is only invoked among states in their treaty relations 
inter se. Nullity equates to a reserving state ‘shooting blanks’, reservations which will never 
have a consequence for another State Party to the treaty. Because invalid reservations to 
human rights treaties affect the state-human being relationship and human beings cannot 
invoke nullity, severability provides a more concrete consequence in response to a 
reservation that is determined to be invalid.  
 
1.4.3.1 Severability 
There is no recognition of severing reservations in the Vienna Convention. The concept has 
been developed primarily through court and treaty body jurisprudence and has gained 
increasing recognition among states. Severability proposes that when an invalid or 
incompatible reservation is made then the author state will be bound to the treaty ‘without the 
benefit’143 of the reservation. Redgwell highlights that: 
 
Severance is conceptually closer to the regime envisaged by the Genocide 
[Opinion], where the International Court of Justice, in departing from the 
unanimity rule, was at pains to ensure that complete freedom to make 
                                                          
143 The preferred ILC terminology for severance. For a more complete analysis of the severability principle see 
Kasey L. McCall-Smith, “Severing Reservations”, 63:3 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(forthcoming July 2014).  
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reservations did not include the ability to formulate reservations striking at the 
core of the treaty; hence the compatibility test.144  
 
The Genocide Opinion concluded that even in the event that a reservation had been objected 
to by a State Party to the Genocide Convention the reserving state would still become a party 
to the Convention unless the reservation was not compatible with its object and purpose. The 
Court offered little guidance other than to suggest that an incompatible reservation would be 
severable. The advantage to this approach is that the state will remain bound to the treaty.145  
 
In a bid to fill the consequences gap and with the support of the treaty bodies,146 the ILC put 
forth their most progressive guideline detailing the status of a state that has formulated an 
invalid reservation. Departing from previous views on regional human rights approaches to 
invalid reservations,147 the Guide to Practice indicates that the reservation will be severed.  
 
4.5.3 Status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to the treaty 
1. The status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to a treaty 
depends on the intention expressed by the reserving State or international 
organization on whether it intends to be bound by the treaty without the benefit 
of the reservation or whether it considers that it is not bound by the treaty.  
2. Unless the author of the invalid reservation has expressed a contrary 
intention or such an intention is otherwise established, it is considered a 
contracting State or a contracting organization without the benefit of the 
reservation. 
                                                          
144 Redgwell, “Reservations and General Comment No. 24(52)”, 410. 
145 Ibid., 407. 
146 Chairpersons of the HRTBs, 2007 Report on Reservations, para. 16(7). 
147 ILC, UN Doc. A/52/10 (1997), para. 84. In the report Pellet suggested that the Strasbourg approach was a 
form of regional customary law that did not otherwise impact customary law on reservations. 
46 
 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, the author of the invalid reservation 
may express at any time its intention not to be bound by the treaty without the 
benefit of the reservation. 
4. If a treaty monitoring body expresses the view that a reservation is invalid 
and the reserving State or international organization intends not to be bound by 
the treaty without the benefit of the reservation, it should express its intention 
to that effect within a period of twelve months from the date at which the treaty 
monitoring body made its assessment. 
 
This guideline applies a rebuttable presumption that the author state formulating an invalid 
reservation will remain bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation unless the 
state expresses an alternative intention.  
 
Thus the guideline adheres to the principle of severability, without using the specific term 
except in the commentary, but allows room for movement in the instance that the author 
state’s consent to be bound is tied to the acceptance of its reservation. This position pays 
deference to the regional human rights courts, the treaty bodies and reflects the growing 
recognition of the principle by states and observers. 148 The Guide to Practice also advocates 
the doctrine of ‘divisibility’ or ‘severability’ if a reservation is formulated which clearly 
contravenes Article 19(a) or (b).  
 
While this step to cure the consequences gap perpetuated by the Vienna Convention is 
undoubtedly one in the right direction, there is still a question as to whether the proposal will 
pass muster in the larger international community of states. Early indicators suggest that a 
                                                          
148 Goodman, “Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent”; Redgwell, “Reservations and 
General Comment No. 24(52)”, 411. 
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‘severance rule’ will not sit easily with all states.149 The lack of a consistent practice by states 
as to how invalid reservations should be handled has consistently impeded resolution of the 
issue despite the clear growth in the recognition of the severability principle. Outwith the ILC 
and the treaty bodies the one point that is undisputed about the consequence of an invalid 
reservation is that there is no settled practice or common agreement on how to resolve the 
issue particularly in the context of state-to-state treaty relations.  
  
1.4.4 Determining Reservation Validity 
As argued elsewhere, establishing a final view on reservation validity would be the logical 
first step toward determining the legal effect and consequence of an invalid reservation.150 
Clearly this could prove difficult in light of the competing organs which are competent to 
assess reservations. Despite the ambiguity of the object and purpose test, states have proved 
that they can apply the test to determine the validity of a reservation. However, due to the 
lack of guidance on legal effect and the consequence of an invalid reservation, reserving 
states have largely ignored other State Parties’ determinations of invalidity. The ILC asserts 
nullity and severance as the legal effect and consequence of an invalid reservation, however, 
in practice there remains resistance to these concepts especially in the state-to-state 
relationships created in the course of accepting and objecting to reservations. States that have 
formulated invalid reservations continue to maintain the validity of their reservations because 
there is no definitive rule enunciating at what point the validity of a reservation can no longer 
be in doubt. Unfortunately, even objections purporting to sever the incompatible reservations 
rarely bear effect on the reserving states as it is unlikely that an objecting state would pursue 
                                                          
149 Comments by Germany and the United States in ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/639 (2011), paras. 149-50 and 170-
82 and compare with, Comments by El Salvador and Finland, in paras. 135-36 and 138-45; UN Treaty 
Collection, CRPD, Sweden”s objection to El Salvador”s reservation to CRPD; Observations by the 
Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 
24 (52) relating to reservations, UN Doc. A/50/40 (1995). 
150 McCall-Smith, “Reservations and the Determinative Function”. 
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a reserving state in an international arena, such as the ICJ, merely to have confirmation that 
the reservation is invalid and, therefore, severable.  
 
While the increased acknowledgement of severability is an advantage to the human rights 
system as a whole, its actual impact is rather limited in the state-to-state context as states do 
not enjoy reciprocal rights and obligations under the core human rights treaties. The rights-
holders who are affected are not recognised under the Vienna Convention. This situation 
illuminates the ineffectiveness of the objection practice for producing a tangible legal effect 
or consequence in the face of an invalid reservation. As outlined by Swaine,  
 
…the suggestion that states are inadequate [to be the sole arbiter of 
reservations] calls into question a premise more or less common to the 
permissibility and opposability approaches—the acceptance of state appraisals, 
through objections or otherwise, govern the acceptance of reservations—and  
creates doubt as to whether the Vienna Convention is a complete regulatory 
system.151 
 
While the Vienna Convention regime may not be complete, the flexibility of the system and 
the recognition that the tools for interpreting a treaty might expand (Article 31) suggests that 
progressive practices have the potential to better guide the effects of invalid reservations to 
human rights treaties. The ambiguities of the Vienna Convention reservations regime could 
be more appropriately addressed if an arbiter of reservation validity outwith the State Parties 
were designated to provide final review of questionable reservations. The core UN human 
rights treaties are uniquely situated to designate a competent reservation review mechanism 
                                                          
151 Swaine, “Reserving”, 322.  
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in light of the treaty-specific supervisory mechanisms which already play a central role in 
monitoring treaty implementation by State Parties.152  
 
Reservations to human rights conventions should not, in the words of Golsong, be left to ‘the 
play of objection and acceptance on the part of other Contracting States’.153 The beneficiaries 
of obligations established by the core human rights treaties are deprived of the full benefits of 
these treaties due to the normative gaps in the Vienna Convention regime. Recognising the 
treaty bodies as competent arbiters of reservation validity would be a step-forward in 
providing coherence in the normative order that oversees international human rights.  
 
The Guide to Practice affirmed the long-standing treaty body assertion that in addition to 
Contracting States, treaty bodies could serve in a determinative capacity in evaluating 
reservation permissibility.154 The Guide, however, took special care to not give precedence to 
one assessment organ over another: 
 
3.2 Assessment of the permissibility of reservation 
The following may assess, within their respective competences, the 
permissibility of reservations to a treaty formulated by a State or an 
international organization: 
• Contracting States or contracting organizations 
• Dispute settlement bodies 
• Treaty monitoring bodies 
 
                                                          
152 McCall-Smith, “Reservations and the Determinative Function”, pp. 537 et seq. 
153 Herbert Golsong, “Les reserves aux instruments internationaux pour la protection des droits de l”homme”, 
cited in Imbert, “Reservations and Human Rights Conventions”, 35. 
154 ILC, Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.744 (2009), p. 3-4, draft guideline 3.2. 
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Thus these organs share a determinative capacity and may not determine validity to the 
exclusion of one another, which makes sense considering the varying relationships each will 
have with a reserving state. Unfortunately, the ILC attempt to provide guidance on the issue 
of legal effect flowing from a reservation assessment by a treaty body serves only to reinforce 
the current limits of any legal effect rather than to clarify:  
  
3.2.1 Competence of the treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of 
reservations 
1. A treaty monitoring body may, for the purpose of discharging the functions 
entrusted to it, assess the permissibility of reservations formulated by a State or 
an international organization.  
2. The assessment made by such a body in the exercise of this competence 
shall have no greater legal effect than that of the act which contains it.  
 
For treaties of general applicability composed of reciprocal obligations the even playing field 
envisioned by this guideline is suitable because the legal effect is more easily ascertained. 
However, in the context of human rights treaties, the absence of hierarchy coupled with the 
lack of concrete consequence for invalid reservations results in a futile confirmation of that 
which has been widely accepted without addressing the more important question of how the 
different assessment organs should work together.   
 
Treaty bodies are clearly at liberty to assess reservations as part of the periodic reporting 
procedure. This is supported by Vienna Convention Article 31 as well as the evolving 
practice of the treaty bodies as recognised by states. Though this is an essential and effective 
role, in most cases it is clear from the reports issued by each of the bodies that compliance 
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with the reporting procedures are far from perfect and their observations on the reports often 
fall on deaf ears. The disparity among the treaty bodies in their approaches to reservations 
over the past thirty years highlights the ambiguity of the Vienna Convention rules. The lack 
of options regarding legal effect available to the treaty bodies as constituent organs as 
opposed to State Parties does not, without further clarification, leave them many options as 
permissibility and opposability are not available choices.  
 
The existence of the treaty bodies is more readily comparable to the supervisory organs of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. 
Thus the roles of the treaty bodies must be strengthened and this can only be done effectively 
by refinement and state recognition of their competencies. ‘[T]he integrity of human rights 
treaties calls for the recognition of the role that international supervisory machinery can play 
in monitoring reservations filed by states, as a step toward more effective implementation of 
human rights norms.’155 In her examination of the CEDAW Committee’s crusade on 
reservations, Schöpp-Schilling notes that no actor was specified to decide on the 
compatibility of reservations and though ‘the Committee’s efforts…had proven successful in 
bringing the issue onto the agenda and into the final documents of the World Conference on 
Human Rights, the issue…remain[s] unresolved.’156 The tools exist to rectify decisions on 
reservation compatibility, but there are important steps that must be taken in order for the 
entirety of states to recognise the value of the system already in place.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
                                                          
155 Shelton, “State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties”, 234. 
156 Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, “Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments”, in I. Ziemele (ed.), 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony or 
Reconciliation (2004), pp. 3-40, 17-18. 
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Several gaps in the application of the reservations rules to human rights treaties remain 
despite the concerted efforts of ILC over the course of its almost two decade study on 
reservations. Admittedly, they are difficult gaps to fill, yet it seems clear that international 
law, and treaty law in particular, possesses the flexibility to foster change. Logical steps can 
be taken to close the gaps and the Guide to Practice set this change in motion. While it is 
difficult to tell how much influence the Guide to Practice will have on states, particularly in 
light of their lack of interest in providing information on state reservations practice, there 
must be a starting point. The UN General Assembly noted the major importance of the topic 
of reservations and the Guide to Practice in December 2013.157 Though this is an important 
step in support for the outcome of such a prodigious project, Pellet notes that the Guide to 
Practice ‘…will live its own life; practice only will be judge of its adaptation to the needs of 
the international community’. 158 
 
If the object and purpose test remains as the ultimate test of reservations permissibility, the 
end product of a decision using the test must be objectively identifiable. Ultimately, the 
competing ideas regarding legal effect and consequence signify uneasiness with the rules as 
they exist and a lack of settled practice on the international level. The ILC, the treaty bodies 
and many states favour severability. While this is a welcomed result for human rights 
advocates, it remains to be seen whether a majority of states will fall in line with this point of 
view. One thing is clear; unless a definitive view is taken on the invalidity of a reservation, it 
seems that there can be no resolution of the issue of legal effect or consequence.   
 
In over sixty years, little progress has been made toward clarifying reservations to human 
rights treaties despite more than one considerable effort. Many question why there is any 
                                                          
157 UN General Assembly, Resolution 68/111 – Reservations to treaties, UN Doc. A/RES/68/111 (2013) 
158 Pellet, “A General Presentation by the Special Rapporteur”, 1094 (footnotes omitted). 
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need for clarification and the most obvious answer is that the number of regulatory treaties is 
steadily increasing and not just in the realm of human rights. If international law is intended 
to expand—and in light of the multitude of multilateral treaties on the horizon expansion 
appears to be the intention—then at the very least the rules must be clear so that the 
codification of international law is not a futile effort. Whilst the opportunity to resolve 
reservations dilemmas for many of the core human rights treaties has passed, it is incumbent 
on international lawyers to provide a solution for the question of reservations for the treaties 
of the future that will govern how we as a human race, and our governments as our 
international guardians, operate in this shared space.  
 
